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ABSTRACT 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSE SPENDING AND 
INFLATION: AN EMPRICAL ANALYSIS FOR TURKEY 
 
Günana, Tayfun 
M.B.A., Department of Management 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Levent Akdeniz 
 
July 2004 
 
 
This study estimates the relationship between defense expenditures and inflation 
in Turkey over the period of 1950-2001 by employing a Johansen Cointegration 
analysis and Granger Causality test.  The different views that appear in the 
literature on this relationship are identified and it is concluded that there is no 
agreement as to the exact nature of the relationship between defense spending 
and inflation.  The results of this study indicate that defense expenditures and 
inflation have a significant effect on each other both in the long and in the short 
run.  In other words, there is Granger feedback (X↔Y) between defense 
spending and inflation for Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Defense expenditures, inflation, budget deficit, money growth, 
Johansen Cointegration, Direct Granger Causality. 
iv 
ÖZET 
 
 
SAVUNMA HARCAMALARI İLE ENFLASYON ARASINDAKI İLİŞKİ: 
TÜRKİYE İÇİN AMPRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA 
 
Günana, Tayfun 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İşletme Fakültesi 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Levent Akdeniz 
 
Temmuz 2004 
 
  
Bu çalışma, Johansen ko-entegresyon analizini ve Granger Nedensellik testini 
kullanarak, 1950-2001 yılları arasında Türkiye’de savunma harcamaları ile 
enflayon arasindaki ilişkiyi ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır.  Tez içerisinde bu 
konu ile ilgili literatürde yer alan değişik görüşler ortaya konmuş ve savunma 
harcamaları ile enflasyon arasındaki ilişkinin yönü ve yapısı hakkında bir fikir 
birliğine varılamadığı görülmüştür.  Yapılan çalışmanın neticesinde, savunma 
harcamaları ile enflasyonun birbirleri üzerinde hem uzun dönemde, hem de kısa 
dönemde önemli etkilerinin olduğu görülmüştür.  Başka bir deyişle, Türkiye’de, 
savunma harcamaları ile enflasyon arasında bir Granger geri besleme süreci 
mevcuttur. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Savunma harcamaları, enflasyon, bütçe açığı, para arzı 
büyümesi, Johansen Ko-entegresyon analizi, Direkt Granger Nedenselliği. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Initially, it is important to know the reasons why Turkey gives great importance 
to defense.  The threats and risks that Turkey has confronted with in the post-
Cold War period are rather different from those in the past.  At the end of the 
Cold War and the struggle between blocks, there was a search for a new world 
order by the effect of globalization, which also changed the concepts of threat.  
While the concept of threat was previously evident and large at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, it has become multi-directional, multi-dimensional.  The 
traditional concept of threat has now started to contain new threats and risks 
emerging in the form of (White Book, 2002, Part IV): 
 
– Regional and ethnic conflicts, 
– Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries, 
– Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, 
– Religious fundamentalism, 
– Smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons and 
– International terrorism. 
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As one of the main centers of attraction due to its historical heritage, cultural 
richness, democracy, economy and modernity, Turkey is located in the midst of 
regions such as the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, where the 
balances are undergoing a process of change and which are full of instability and 
uncertainty.  It is obvious in Table 1 that the strongest growth in military 
expenditure is realized in Middle East in which Turkey is located.  As a result of 
extreme nationalist, expansionist and aggressive tendencies of its regional 
neighbors, Turkey lives together with the threats of radical fundamentalist 
movements, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, long-range 
missiles, and terrorism, in particular.  
 
Table 1: Military Expenditure by Region, in Constant US dollars, 1992-2001 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
World 
Total 847 814 793 741 722 732 719 728 757 772 
Africa 9,3 8,8 9,3 8,9 8,5 8,8 9,3 10,9 11,3 12,2 
Americas 383 367 348 333 314 315 308 308 319 317 
Asia and 
Oceania 105 108 109 112 115 117 117 119 123 129 
Europe 296 278 275 239 235 238 227 233 241 242 
Middle 
East  52,3 51 50,9 47,9 48,9 53,5 57,8 56,1 63,1 72,4 
NATO 557 533 508 481 466 462 457 467 478 472 
Note: (1) Figures are in US $b., at constant 1998 prices and exchange rates. 
(2) Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 2002. 
 
The primary and most important defender of Turkey’s independence is the 
Armed Forces. In today’s Turkey, the primary missions of the Turkish Armed 
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Forces are the defense and protection of the nation and the Republic, and the 
fulfillment of the NATO duties assigned by international treaties. The Turkish 
Armed Forces aim to modernize and upgrade their weapons systems to bring 
them into line with NATO standards, the better to defend national independence 
and to fulfill the requirements of a collective defense system. 
 
With the end of Cold War and East-West armaments race, military expenditures 
have shown a decreasing trend across many countries.  However, Turkey and its 
neighbors are exceptions to the worldwide decreasing military trend for different 
as well as interrelated reasons (See Table 2).   
 
Table 2: Military Expenditures of Turkey and Its Neighbors 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Avrg. 
% ∆ 
Turkey 6470 7153 7006 7184 8044 8380 8781 9696 9383 8885 3,7622 
Greece 4675 4564 4642 4742 5025 5355 5836 6110 6449 6577 3,9149 
Syria 4592 3635 3923 3948 3669 3786 4104 4184 4526 4737 0,7807 
Iran 3596 4516 6129 4537 5131 5745 6064 6148 9110 11515 15,766 
Israel 7808 7296 7346 7578 8159 8207 8539 8511 9012 9107 1,7999 
Russia 80400 70900 68600 43400 39500 42200 30600 35900 40300 43900 -4,769 
Note: (1) Figures are in US $m., at constant 1998 prices and exchange rates. 
(2) Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 2002. 
 
 
 
Given the fact that Turkey is subject to multi-dimensional internal and external 
threats due to its geopolitical and geostrategic location, the achievement of a 
military strength capable of supporting national security policy, the maintenance 
and development of this power depending upon the circumstances and 
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requirements of the century, serve as the milestones of the policy and strategy of 
Turkey.  Being a strength and balance element in the region, Turkey pays more 
attention to defense than some other countries. With the purpose of maintaining 
her national existence, of strengthening her defenses and keeping pace with 
technological progress, Turkey allocates adequate funds to national defense 
within existing possibilities.  Turkey ranked first in arms imports among NATO 
members and second in the Middle East during 1992-1996.  Turkey’s share in 
NATO imports increased from 20% in 1987 to 36% in 1996.  According to 
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) data, despite the fact 
that military expenditures of the European NATO declined on average by 1% 
during 1985-1996, Turkey increased its military expenditures on average by 4%. 
In addition, Turkey has the fourteenth largest defense spending throughout the 
world (See Appendix A). 
 
It will be useful at this point to give the definition of military expenditure in order 
to make reliable comments on this topic.  SIPRI, whose data are used in this 
study, gives the definition of military expenditure that is based on NATO 
definition:  
 
SIPRI military expenditure data include all current and capital 
expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; 
(b) defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in 
defense projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained 
and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space 
activities. 
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Defense is not a free good; like all expenditures, it involves sacrifices of other 
goods and services, raising controversies about military versus social-welfare 
spending and whether defense is a benefit or burden to an economy.  Such issues 
arise in both rich and poor countries.  The economic implications of increased 
expenditures on arming, especially since 1980, have been an interesting issue for 
scholars in Turkey.  Although a number of studies concerning Turkish defense-
growth relation have been published in recent years, little attention is given the 
relationship between defense expenditures and inflation. However, inflation has 
been one of the principal economic problems of Turkey; annual consumer price 
inflation averaged around 80% in the 1990s and nearly 50% in 2000 through 
2003. In addition, wholesale price inflation has been at comparable levels.  
 
Inflation is, without question, a central issue for governments throughout the 
world.  Calleo asserts that “government policy is the efficient if not the ultimate 
cause of inflation” (Calleo, 1981: 784).  Many other researchers would also add 
that inflation obviously motivates governments to adopt certain policies. 
 
Many people including the academic and political environment in Turkey have a 
conviction that inflation is caused by a large budget deficit and governments 
choice to print money in order to finance this deficit.  However, the applied 
studies on the post-World War high inflation economies such as Israel and Latin 
American Countries showed that there is no significant relation among 
seigniorage, budget deficit and inflation (Selçuk, 2001).  On the other hand, 
Friedman (Friedman, 1990) states that budget deficit is clearly inflationary if it is 
  6 
financed by creating money.  There are several studies that indicate a significant 
relationship among budget deficit, money growth and inflation in Turkey (Abaan, 
1993; Ülengin, 1995; Kalkan, et al., 1997; Metin, 1998). 
 
Figure 1: Defense Expenditures as a Share of General Budget  
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 Note: (1) Expenditures of the Ministry of Defense, the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard are 
included. 
(2) Source: “The Realizations of Budget Income and Expenditures, 1924-1991” published by the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
Defense spending is, of course, one of the governmental policies most frequently 
linked to inflation.  Policymakers and analysts have come to realize that security 
is a more complex issue than simply spending money for defense.  For example, 
Knorr has noted that the “question of national priorities raised by military 
demands turns on the relation between the expected utility of satisfying these 
demands . . . and the expected disutility imposed by opportunity costs” (Knorr, 
1977: 192).  The defense burden of the general budget of Turkey can be seen 
clearly in Figure 1.  Although the extra budget sources, like Defense Industry 
Support Fund of Turkey, are excluded in Figure 1, it is obvious that a 
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considerable part of the budget is devoted to defense expenditures.  In addition, 
the budget deficit of Turkey increased steadily especially since 1985 (See 
Appendix B).  From these figures, one can conclude that defense expenditure is 
one of the main reasons for increasing budget deficit in Turkey.  
 
The complex relationship between defense spending and inflation has been of 
interest to scholars and policymakers at least since World War II.  Although 
concern with the strength and form of such a relationship is not new, the interest 
has been taken up with renewed enthusiasm in Turkey; because Turkey initiated 
an arms industry modernization programme in early 1980 with an estimated cost 
of 10-12 billion dollars at time of initiation, a policy of attacking inflation yet 
increasing defense spending to record high levels.  Off course, defense spending 
does not have a direct relationship with inflation, but on the other hand it has an 
implicit effect on inflation by increasing budget deficit.  As stated above, 
inflation comes into existence when the government monetizes the budget deficit. 
 
Yet there is no agreement among economists, political scientists, or policy 
analysts as to the exact nature of the relationship between defense spending and 
inflation.  The thesis will attempt to shed some light on this matter by identifying 
the alternative views on the relationship between defense spending and inflation 
that appear in the literature and subjecting them to empirical examination.  While 
several studies have examined the relationship between defense spending and 
inflation in different countries, there is not any study which concentrated only on 
this relationship in Turkey.  For this reason, the thesis has a unique importance.  
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The defense spending and inflation relationship is investigated by using Johansen 
Cointegration test for comovement of variables and applying Direct Granger 
Causality test for predictive ability with data from 1950 to 2001 for Turkey.  The 
empirical results of this study indicate the existence of the significant relationship 
between defense spending and inflation in Turkey.   
 
It is obvious that there are reasons to believe that the character of the relationship 
varies across countries.  It is also worth noting that there is agreement in the 
literature that inflation and defense spending are complex phenomena and 
disagreement over the best way to measure them (for example, Clayton, 1976; 
Boulding, 1979; Weidenbaum, 1974).  A complete model of inflation will not be 
developed in this study.  Instead the thesis aims to begin to sort out the direction 
and extent of the bivariate relationship between defense spending and inflation, 
as a way of approaching a relatively complex topic.  By beginning with simple 
analytic models, it will be possible to comment on the bivariate policy 
recommendations found in both the academic and the journalistic literatures.  The 
thesis also aims to provide the basis for subsequent work on a more complex 
model focusing on defense spending and inflation. 
 
This thesis hopes to uncover interdependence between defense spending and 
inflation and is organized as follows:  In Chapter 2, theoretical background and a 
brief literature survey about budget deficit, money growth and inflation are 
discussed.  The literature review about the relationship between defense spending 
and inflation is given in Chapter 3.  Chapter 4 explains data and methodology. 
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Chapter 5 contains the empirical findings.  Finally conclusion and discussions 
appear in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
BUDGET DEFICIT, MONEY GROWTH AND INFLATION 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
 
The main aim of the thesis is to investigate the relationship between inflation rate 
and defense expenditures in Turkey.  However, the relationship between inflation 
and defense expenditures is closely related with the relationship between budget 
deficit, money growth and inflation rate in Turkey.  Alternative economic theory 
frameworks provide different relationships between these variables. 
 
The first one is the quantity theory of money.  In the quantity theory of money, 
the major factor causing general price level to increase is the quantity of money.  
There are three basic propositions in the quantity theory of money:  1) quantity of 
money is exogenous implying that causality moves from money to price instead 
of vice versa, 2) demand for money is a stable function implying stable velocity 
of circulation, 3) the volume of real transaction and output is determined, 
independently from the quantity of money or price, by real variables such as 
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factor endowments, preferences and technology (Blaug, 1995).  According to the 
quantity theory, inflation is a monetary phenomenon and budget deficit may not 
be inflationary unless it is monetized. 
 
It follows from these propositions that inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be 
produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than 
in output. ...  Government spending may and may not be inflationary.  
It clearly inflationary if it is financed by creating money, that is by 
printing currency or creating bank deposits.  If it is financed by taxes 
or by borrowing from the public, the main affect is that the 
government spends the funds instead of the taxpayer or instead of the 
lender or instead of the person who would otherwise have borrowed 
the funds (Friedman, 1990: 32). 
 
 
In the three variable system containing inflation, money growth and budget 
deficit, money is exogenous and determined by the monetary authority and there 
is no direct link between the size of budget deficit and money growth.  Thus, 
inflation is created via money supply growth to finance budget deficit and 
government can obtain seigniorage and inflation tax revenues through its direct 
control over money creation. 
  
Second theory is the new classical approach, in which, fiscal side of inflationary 
process is raised in addition to the monetary side.  According to the unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic, whether inflation is in the control of monetary authority or 
not is critically depends on the domination of the monetary policy over fiscal 
policy (Sargent and Wallace, 1981).  If the fiscal policy dominates monetary 
policy in which the fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announces all 
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its current and future deficits and surpluses, determines the amount of revenue 
that must be raised through bond sales and seigniorage, and an interest rate on 
bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, then the monetary authority lost 
its control over inflation and monetary base growth. 
 
Which authority moves first, the monetary authority or the fiscal 
authority?  In other words, who imposes discipline on whom?  The 
assumption made in this paper is that the fiscal authority moves first...  
Given this assumption about the game played by the authorities, and 
given our first crucial assumption, the monetary authority can make 
money tighter now only by making it looser later (Sargent and 
Wallace, 1981: 7). 
 
 
This implies that contractionary policy today is higher inflation tomorrow in the 
long run.  Thus, increase in money growth is a natural result of higher budget 
deficit, so inflation is a fiscal phenomenon. 
 
However, there are alternative theories stressing the significance of institutional 
factors and endogeneity of money supply.  Portfolio adjustment approach 
suggests that the link between changes in public sector deficits and changes in the 
money supply depends on many factors including institutional structure of the 
economy and nature of the financing decision.  This approach takes into account 
the asset preferences of the public and the liability management of the financial 
system.  Commercial banks are profit-maximizing entities operating within a 
specific market setting and have particular risk-preferences.  Commercial banks 
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expand credit if it is profitable.  The relevant issue is whether the restrictions on 
the banks money creation mechanism are effective or not (Jackson, 1990). 
  
If the demand for credit is price-elastic and if the supply of credit is 
price-elastic than the expansion of credit, even under penal conditions 
created by the central bank, must be profitable for the commercial 
banks.  Whether or not a bank deposit multiplier process exits depends 
crucially upon the portfolio decisions of profit-maximizing banks 
facing different risks (Jackson, 1990: 119-20). 
 
  
Proponents of this approach conclude that there is no inevitable link between 
government deficit and money expansion.  In economics with well-developed 
capital markets, government deficits need not be financed through the banking 
system, so there would be no one-to-one relationship between government 
deficits and money stock. 
 
Another alternative approach is the credit counterparts approach.  In this 
approach, balance sheets of the four sectors; officials sector, foreign sector, 
private non-financial sector and financial sector, are used in deriving money 
supply identity.  By using simple national income and expenditure identity, they 
derived the money stock identity.  In this identity, increase in money supply is 
equal to the public sector borrowing requirement less sales of bonds to the non-
bank private sector plus net external inflows plus increase in bank lending to the 
private sector less increase in net non-deposit liabilities.  In sum, credit 
counterparts approach conceives quantity of money stock determination process 
as closely linked to the banks lending activities. “...banks can seek out lending 
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opportunities secure in the knowledge that they can buy in reserves to support 
their loan book-what is known as “liability management” (Artis and Lewis, 1990: 
5). 
  
Financing budget deficit by selling government bonds or bills to the banks may 
or may not increase money stock depending on the perception of the newly 
issued government debt instruments as a rival or not to the private sector 
borrowing instruments.  In the case of rivalry between public and private debt 
instruments government borrowing may crowd out the private borrowing and so 
money stock remain unchanged.  If there is no rivalry between them, especially if 
banks have excess free reserves, government borrowing only increases the total 
credit stock and the money stock.  In the later case, crowding out of the private 
borrowing does not occur. 
 
The problem of time inconsistency in monetary policy is also discussed as a 
factor creating difficulties to the monetary authority to control money supply.  
Time inconsistency problem asserts that monetary policy aiming to simulate 
growth, smoothing the business cycle or stabilizing exchange rates in addition to 
its prime concern, controlling inflation, will not provide stable money.  Not only 
the path of developments of these multi-targets may contradict but public 
expectations take the possibility that monetary authority may deviate from its 
inflation objective into account.  Monetary authority’s credibility may be 
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destroyed and the stable link between money stock and inflation may be lost 
(Neumann, 1996). 
 
 
2.2 A Brief Literature Survey on Recent Economic Studies 
 
In a study (Alper and Üçer, 1998), authors run an unrestricted vector 
autoregression to test the predictive content of fiscal against the balance of 
payments views as well as to find out the impact of inertia and public sector 
prices on inflation.  In the empirical part of their study they conclude that more 
than 90 percent of variation in inflation is explained by the past inflation instead 
of exchange rate depreciation or money growth implying that there is inertia in 
the Turkish inflation. 
 
In addition, Granger causality tests are also applied to the Turkish data (Abaan, 
1993; Ülengin, 1995).  For the period 1983-90, Abaan (1993) found bi-
directional Granger Causality between currency issued and inflation rate, which 
implies endogeneity of the currency issued to the path of price.  He also found 
M1 and M3 endogenous with respect to inflation.  Interestingly his study 
indicated bi-directional causality between M2 and inflation, which also indicates 
feedback from inflation to M2.  
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The study by Ülengin (1995) is the application of the multivariate Granger 
Causality for the period 1981-92 and two different close circuits of inflationary 
processes are identified.  The first circle is among budget deficit, reserve money 
and inflation.  The budget deficit Granger causes reserve money while 
simultaneously reserve money Granger cause budget deficit.  In turn reserve 
money Granger causes inflation and inflation Granger causes budget deficit. 
Budget deficit increases reserve money growth, rise in money growth increases 
inflation rate and in turn rise in inflation rate and reserve money increase budget 
deficit.  This process is a self-fulfilling, process, which repeats itself.  The second 
circle is among reserve money, inflation and exchange rate.  There are bi-
directional Granger causality between exchange rate and reserve money and, 
exchange rate and inflation.  Increase in either of the variable would start a self-
fulfilling inflationary process. 
 
Another study was related to leading indicators of inflation (Kalkan, et al., 1997).  
Interbank interest rate and exchange rate were estimated as the strongest leading 
indicators of inflation.  Interestingly, predictive power of TL dominated monetary 
aggregates was considerably weak.  Generally, Granger causality moves from 
inflation to TL dominated monetary aggregates.  In contrast, the predictive power 
of foreign currency aggregates and monetary aggregates consisting foreign 
currencies on inflation were estimated quite high.  Lastly, public sector deficit is 
found to be Granger cause inflation. 
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Despite its lack of identifying long-run relations, Granger causality gives 
important insights to the short-run dynamics of inflations in Turkey.  But, it 
should be noted that findings of all these studies may radically diverge depending 
on the period coverage and the way that causality applied.  The more advanced 
econometric studies using cointegration is required to identify long-run 
equilibrium relations (for example, Yavan, 1993; Koğar, 1995; Tekin, 1997; 
Metin, 1998). 
 
Yavan (1993) performed Johansen’s Method of cointegration and he estimated 
the long-run money demand function of Turkey.  Even though, four statistically 
significant cointegration vectors were estimated, Yavan concludes that the only 
one of them is interpretable.  The interpretable cointegration relation is the money 
demand function.  Money demand was found positively affected from inflation, 
real growth and interest rates.  
 
Koğar (1995) estimated the long-run money demand function by using quarterly 
data from 1978Q1 to 1990Q4 and applying the Johansen’s cointegration method.  
She also found a positive long-run effect of real income on money demand.  She 
estimated the coefficients of inflation and interest rates in the money demand as 
negative. 
 
Tekin’s (1997) thesis on the subject, which is the application of Johansen’s 
cointegration method, also has valuable conclusions.  One of her major 
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conclusion is that budget deficit is the main cause of inflation in Turkey.  She 
also found budget deficit weakly exogenous to the system.  Another conclusion is 
that inflation determines the currency growth rate in the long run.  This finding 
supports the endogeneity of the money supply arguments.  She also performed a 
trivariate cointegration and she estimated the inflation and the reserve money as 
endogenous and the budget deficit weakly exogenous to the system.  Finally, she 
concludes that inflation is not a pure monetary phenomenon in Turkey but a 
fiscal problem. 
 
Lastly, Metin’s (1998) study on the similar set of variables identified 3 significant 
cointegration relations in which one is inflation equation.  She used quarterly data 
of Turkey over the 1950-87 period with real growth rate, scaled base money, 
budget deficit and inflation rate in the variable space.  In the inflation equation, 
inflation is positively related to the scaled budget deficit and scaled base money. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Different Views on Relationship between Defense Spending and Inflation  
 
There is no widespread agreement about the existence and form of the 
relationship between defense spending and inflation.  While many observers 
argue that defense spending has a clear and direct causal effect on inflation, three 
other possibilities exist, and each has its own proponents and supporting 
rationale.  Not only may defense spending affect inflation but also inflation may 
affect defense spending; in addition, each may affect the other in a two-way 
relationship or there may be no relationship between defense spending and 
inflation.  The general arguments that have been presented for each of these 
possible relationships are reviewed below.  
 
3.1.1 Defense Spending Affects Inflation 
 
The financing of defense expenditure has an important impact on its 
inflationary consequences. At one extreme, money financed defense 
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expenditures have the highest chance of creating an inflationary environment. 
At the opposite extreme is taxation which directly limits private demand. 
 
It is commonly argued that defense spending is an economic instrument, a 
macroeconomic tool.  In USA, The Council of Economic Priorities notes simply 
that military spending is the largest mechanism available to the federal 
government for stimulating the economy with purchases (DeGrasse, 1983: 153).  
That is why policymakers often perceive that defense spending is useful in 
affecting both recession and inflation.  The main assumption is the widespread, 
fundamental belief that defense spending is inflationary.  The usually well-paying 
defense contractors create increased domestic purchasing power that is not met 
by increase in domestically produced civilian goods.  When demand or 
purchasing power exceeds supply in any economic system, the requirements for 
the classic definition of inflation have been met (Hartman, 1973).  Military 
spending by its non-productive demand generating nature is inherently 
inflationary. For example, this has been the pattern in USA historically: 
 
We have had four periods of extreme inflation and deflation since 
1800- all produced by war.  The Civil War and World War I each 
doubled prices.  World War II increased prices by 50 percent.  The 
Korean War further increased the cost if living by about ten percent 
(Clayton, 1970: 63). 
 
 
Several observers (Calleo, 1981; Steel, 1981) link defense spending to domestic 
and foreign policies that overextend, due to the conscious efforts of those 
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pursuing ambitious policies who are unwilling to tax or to cut back expenditures 
of a nation’s resources in other areas, thus leading to inflation.  
 
Similar arguments are found in discussions linking war to inflation (Hamilton, 
1977; Stein, 1980; Melman, 1970).  Without taxation to cover the costs of 
warfare, war is found to be clearly inflationary:  “Wars and revolutions have been 
the principal causes of hyperinflation in industrial countries in the last two 
centuries” (Hamilton, 1977: 18).  A Congressional Budget Office report indicates 
that when the United States rapidly expanded defense expenditures in past war 
situations (using 1917, 1941, 1950, and 1965 as points of comparison), a 
substantial increase in inflation followed (Sandler and Hartley, 1990).  The 
average inflation rate for the three-year periods preceding those dates was 3.55%, 
compared to a 7.3% average inflation rate for the three-year periods subsequent 
to those dates. 
 
Furthermore, Hamilton (1977) and Stein (1980) point out that inflation is both 
much the easiest way to pay for war and a policy preferred to taxation.  
Resources for defense spending can be provided from increased taxation, cuts in 
non-defense spending, and/or deficit spending.  Thus one alternative is to cut 
government spending in other areas, such as social services.  This is the focus of 
the literature on the opportunity costs or trade-offs of defense spending.  While 
the results differ somewhat from country to country, several studies demonstrate 
some trade-off between peacetime defense spending and certain forms of social 
welfare expenditure, investment, and/or private consumption (Caputo, 1975; 
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Russett, 1970, 1969; Peroff and Podolak-Warren, 1979; Smith, 1980; Deger and 
Smith, 1983; DeGrasse, 1983). 
 
Later studies qualify the earlier findings of peacetime defense spending and 
trade-offs.  Investigating trade-offs in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Federal Republic of Germany during the 1948-1978 period, it is 
found that there are no trade-off patterns in the short term (meaning yearly 
changes in spending levels) (Domke, et al., 1983).  Trade-offs are discovered in 
long-term trends, but they occur only in periods of war or of postwar 
reconstruction.  Russett (1982), looking at the effects of rates of change in 
military spending on federal health and education expenditures in the United 
States, found no systematic trade-off. Later, Mintz (1989) replicated Russett`s 
(1982) with less aggregated data on military spending.  Mintz`s analysis confirms 
Russett`s (1982) and Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher`s (1983) findings of no 
trade-off in the period from 1947 to 1980.  All these researches, so far, consider 
only the direct affects of military spending but also there is an indirect affect to 
be considered (Mintz, Huang, 1991).  Their findings confirm earlier findings 
reported in above researches of a lack of evidence for a direct guns-butter trade-
off but show the existence of an indirect effect between military spending and 
education spending.  In other words, they found that military spending crowds 
out investment, which slows down economic growth, thereby putting pressure on 
education spending.  They also indicated that it took about six years for such an 
indirect trade-off to be realized.  In Turkey, it is found that while military 
spending decisions are made independently of health and education expenditure, 
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there are trade-offs between defense and welfare spending (Sezgin and Yıldırım, 
2002).  While the trade-off is negative between defense and health, it is positive 
between defense and education. 
 
The view that defense spending is responsible for inflation is also based on 
arguments that the economic nature of military goods leads to inflation (Dumas, 
1977; Melman, 1978; Thurow, 1981; Franko, 1982).  The central point is that 
defense spending is nonproductive, unlike other forms of economic activity 
(including other types of government spending).  It is argued that defense 
spending generates no additional purchasing power.  The complex economic 
processes behind this view are summarized by Fallows (1981: 7): 
 
The first principle is that defense spending is inherently more 
inflationary than other kinds of government spending. . . .  The 
problem with military spending, simply put, is that it adds to the 
demand for goods without adding to the supply. . . .  Military and non-
military spending add to the demand; military spending does not add 
to supply.  
    
 
  
The manner in which the military procures goods and services is also considered 
to be inflationary.  For example, Melman (1978) argues that firms serving the 
military run their businesses on a cost-maximizing basis and that this becomes a 
model for increases in costs and prices in the civilian sector as well.  Because 
there are many military needs that can be supplied by only a few firms, and for 
this reason Schultze (1981) argues that heavy and rapid military spending can 
strain the industrial base by leading to bottlenecks and shortages.  The danger is 
the adverse affect such bottlenecks will have on productivity. 
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The effect of defense spending on the general price level can be transmitted 
through changes in aggregate demand and/or aggregate supply.  On the demand 
side, rapid defense buildups contribute to acceleration of nominal demand growth 
that will affect inflation adversely if not offset by tax increases or monetary 
growth reductions.  In this respect, the demand side effect of increased defense 
spending is no different from that of other government expenditures (Schultze, 
1981). 
 
A related argument focuses on the short-term effects of switching expenditures 
from the civilian to the military sectors of the economy (DeGrasse, 1983; Franko, 
1982).  Defense spending increases the demand for labor, machinery, and capital 
as supplier firms gear up for increased production.  In the short-term, the 
aggregate supply of labor, machinery, and capital is more or less fixed.  
Therefore, in the short-term, a rapid increase in defense spending should produce 
an increase in wages, prices, and rents.  Thus, for given demand pressure and 
inflation expectations, defense spending has a potential supply side effect on the 
rate of price inflation similar to the effect of the oil price shocks of the 1970s 
(Capra, 1981).  Even in the long term, the supply of certain factors (e.g., trained 
engineers) will not respond quickly to increased demand, and there may be some 
long-term effects.  In addition, one can expect those industries in the civilian 
sector that require the same inputs as firms in the military sector to face severe 
shortages of supply which they are likely to pass on in the form of sharply higher 
prices.  This is what DeGrasse (1983) calls “sectoral inflation”.  Finally, civilian 
technological progress is likely to be hindered by the diversion of capital and 
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expertise to the military sector, thus reducing the ability of the civilian sector to 
offset rising production costs through technological innovation. 
 
It is also argued in the literature that defense spending generates a greater public 
debt, which is inherently inflationary.  For example, DeGrasse (1983) sees the 
Reagan administration’s fiscal policies leading to large federal deficits due 
mostly to defense spending, which are expected to exceed the peak deficits of the 
Vietnam War and thus could stimulate inflation.   The deficits caused by defense 
spending could produce more inflation if it is financed by increasing money 
supply.  Şimşek (1993) states that if the military expenditure is the one of the 
main causes of budget deficit, finally, it causes inflation by money creation. 
 
In other words, defense spending can lead to inflation through deficit spending if 
the economy has idle capacity at the time deficits increase and/or deficit spending 
is attractive as an alternative to cutting back nonmilitary expenditures because of 
the desire on the part of the government to stimulate the economy and its relative 
unconcern with the possible inflationary consequences. 
 
Vitaliano (1984) tested the hypothesis that rapid defense buildups contribute to 
inflation and finally he found that defense spending has a discernible influence on 
the rate of inflation.  His results indicate that "there appears to be no perceptible 
impact on the rate of price inflation separably attributable to defense spending" 
(Vitaliano, 1984).  The most troublesome aspect of Vitaliano's work is his use of 
the nominal rate of interest as a proxy for the expected inflation rate.  This causes 
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an error-in-variable bias (i.e., bias due to misspecification of explanatory 
variables) if the expected real rate is not constant (Wilcox, 1983).  In this case, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators will be biased and inconsistent, and the 
classical test of hypothesis produces misleading results (Nourzad, 1987).  Even if 
the model did not suffer from this problem, the estimates still would be biased 
and inconsistent due to the simultaneous equation bias that results from the 
interaction between inflation and the nominal interest rate. Nourzad (1987) 
corrects this bias by applying a second order Almon-distributed lag structure for 
the expected inflation rate.  In contrast to Vitaliano's findings, Nourzad (1987) 
finds defense spending to have an inflationary impact.  Since all other factors are 
common between the two models, the difference in the conclusions is attributable 
to the different measures of the expected inflation rate. 
 
The effect of increased defense spending on the balance of payments is yet 
another way in which it can affect inflation.  The component of defense spending 
that is actually spent abroad (e.g., for military personnel and facilities) contributes 
to payments deficits.  The effects of the payment deficit on inflation depends on 
how big the deficit is and how it is financed.  A large deficit can induce 
downward revaluation of the currency exchange rate and thus make imports more 
expensive and exports more competitive.  The increased cost of imports and the 
increased price of goods exported, due to increased foreign demand, may result in 
some increases in the overall rate of inflation.  A large deficit, if financed by 
domestic borrowing can actually be deflationary, to the extent that it diverts 
capital away from domestic production and reduces aggregate demand.  In 
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addition, if import controls are introduced to reduce a balance of payments 
deficit, the end result may be deflation rather than inflation. 
 
Finally, if the country with a large deficit is a key currency country (a country 
whose currency is widely used by many nations as a means of transacting 
international business), that country can simply continue to run a deficit for a 
time and justify it in terms of the need for currencies to enhance global liquidity.  
It is obvious that this strategy will have a negative effect on the exchange rate of 
the key currency country eventually, but historically, key country currencies have 
been able to run balance of payment deficits for quite some time before running 
into this difficulty. 
 
 
 3.1.2 Inflation Affects Defense Spending 
 
Several researchers (Kaufman, 1972; Capra, 1981) argue that inflation is a 
powerful factor in rising defense expenditures.  As inflation increases, it has an 
impact on costs and cost-overruns, and it cuts into the purchasing power of the 
defense dollar.  Proponents of a larger defense budget often argue that increases 
in defense spending are required to compensate for inflation and maintain the 
targeted level of real defense spending.  This is a kind of indexing of defense 
spending to inflation that creates a causal link between the two as long as it is 
consistently done over time.  There are international elements to this relationship 
as well.  It might be necessary to increase spending for overseas facilities in allied 
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countries to which large states such as the United States have exported their 
domestic inflation.  In addition, a state may increase defense spending to match 
an opponent whose own defense spending has increased due to inflation.  Thus 
we must consider the possibility that inflation is a major determinant of increased 
defense spending.  On the other hand, it is conceivable that inflation may 
stimulate cuts in defense spending as governments use defense spending as an 
inflation-reducing device. 
 
 
3.1.3 Two-Way Relationship between Defense Spending and Inflation 
 
If defense spending does have an impact on inflation, then many observers would 
entertain the prospect that the relationship between defense spending and 
inflation involves a complex two way feedback process.  Indeed, most of the 
literature is consistent with the idea of either a one-way relationship wherein 
defense spending affects inflation or a complex two-way feedback relationship 
between defense spending and inflation. 
 
 
3.1.4 No Relation between Defense Spending and Inflation 
 
It is obvious that defense spending and inflation do not have a direct relationship.  
Publications by several researchers also emphasize that defense spending and 
inflation do not have any meaningful relationship.  One view, illustrated by a 
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Merrill Lynch Economics analysis (Forbes, January 21, 1980), suggests that non-
defense policies can and do produce a strong private sector and national economy 
as a whole, and thus enable the economy to absorb higher defense spending 
without increased inflation.  Such policies include reduced government 
regulation, cutting spending in other areas such as the social welfare field, tax 
cuts and growth-oriented tax changes, and policies to take advantage of slack 
capacity in the economy.  The main factor in regard to inflation would be how the 
increased defense spending would be financed.  The Congressional Budget 
Office report (Sandler and Keith, 1990) similarly notes that a slow recovery and 
slack in the economy will permit increased defense spending without inflation in 
the short term.  
 
Schultze (1981: 1) observes:  “The United States is fortunate in having an 
economy, that, with proper policies, can adjust to about as high or low a level of 
defense spending as the nation and its leaders think is appropriate.”  He goes on 
to discuss the special problems that arise over the short run from a rapid increase 
in defense spending.  He also attempts to dispense with the argument that defense 
spending is inherently inflationary.  He argues that defense spending is no more 
inflationary than any other type of government spending (1981: 2):  “In sum, 
government purchases do not add to market supply in the economic sense of the 
term.  Hence taxes must be levied.  But the military nature of the goods is 
absolutely irrelevant.”  He also notes that increases in defense expenditure, as a 
percentage of GNP need not be inflationary; they would be inflationary only if 
those increases came at the expense of investment rather than consumption. 
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Several publications present evidence that there may be no meaningful positive 
relationship between defense spending and inflation.  Calleo (1981: 782) notes 
that prices in the United States have risen approximately 177% since 1960.  At 
the same time, other analysts have demonstrated that defense spending in real 
terms in the United States has been falling for the same time period.  For 
example, Clayton (1976) examines six different methods of measuring U.S. 
defense spending:  (1) Department of Defense [DoD] method, (2) DoD method 
plus retirement pay, (3) Census Bureau method, (4) Joint Economic Committee 
method, (5) DoD Deflator method, and (6) Federal Purchases Deflator method.  
He concludes that no matter which method is used, defense spending in real 
terms has been falling. 
 
Boulding (1979) also presented additional supporting evidence for the no 
relationship hypothesis.  He divides the post-World War I era into four periods:  
(1) the “depressed OS," characterized by enormous deflation; (2) World War II, 
marked by suppressed inflation and huge deficits; (3) the “long boom” of 1948-
1969, marked by moderate deficits and moderate inflation; and (4) the “growing 
crisis” since 1969, marked by large and increasing deficits and accelerating 
inflation.  Defense spending was negligible in the first of these periods, while in 
the second it accounted for the budget deficits and inflation.  In the third period, 
after the Korean War, defense spending does not appear to be closely related to 
government deficits or to inflation.  Finally, in the fourth period, while the 
inflation had been increasing, defense spending declined as a percentage of GNP:  
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“It cannot be blamed for the increasing deficit, and it is hard to blame it for the 
increased rate of inflation” (Boulding, 1979: 94).  Moving on to a comparative 
perspective, Boulding examined data from Japan, West Germany, Italy, France, 
and Canada, and demonstrated the weak relationship between defense spending 
as a percentage of GNP and the rate of inflation.  
 
Employing a Granger causality framework like in our study, Payne (1990) finds 
no evidence to suggest that defense spending causes inflation.  In a research made 
in 1995, using a closed economy IS-LM model with an expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve, no significant relationship between growth in defense spending 
and the inflation rate is found (Sahu et al, 1995).  Unlike prior studies, non-
defense spending included in the analysis.  Neither defense nor non-defense 
spending is found to have a statistically significant impact on inflation.  
 
In sum, much has been written about the link between defense spending and 
inflation but little agreement has been reached about how (or whether) 
government purchases of military goods and services affect and are affected by 
price changes.  It can be seen from the four relationships outlined above.  
Questions have been raised about the rapidity of the increase in defense spending 
and the ways in which it is financed.  Several recent observers have noted the 
differential impacts of defense spending in the short and long terms.  In addition, 
many studies recognize the possibility that the character of the relationship varies 
across countries.  For example, the financing of defense spending may have a 
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greater (or lesser) effect on investment, or defense spending may create more 
severe shortages in particular economies.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Data 
 
“Statistical Indicators, 1923-2002” published by the State Institute of Statistics 
provides data for inflation (consumer price index).  The defense expenditures of 
Turkey are taken from the various issues of SIPRI yearbooks (Swedish 
International Peace Research Institute).  Inflation data go back to 1938, but data 
for defense expenditure are available for 1950 and after. Thus, the data used in 
this study comprise the years 1950-2001.  In addition, annual data are used in the 
thesis. 
 
In econometric studies, it is important to use the right data to get reliable results.  
However, it is hard to reach the right defense expenditure data.  One main 
obvious reason is that expenditures of the Ministry of Defense, the Gendarmerie 
and the Coast Guard are included in the budget, but procurement expenditures 
implemented by the Undersecretariat of Defense Industry and financed by the 
Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF) are excluded.  Finally, in the case of 
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defense expenditures partly financed by extra-budget sources, like the Defense 
Industry Support Fund of Turkey, actual defense expenditures are underestimated 
by the defense expenditures item in the government budget (i.e. the budget of the 
Defense Ministry).  The data from SIPRI yearbooks are used as the all previous 
studies did. 
 
In addition, there is no agreement concerning the form of data set to be used.  
Thus, it is an important issue for empirical studies whether or not to use levels of 
military expenditure or shares of military expenditure out of GDP.  Brauer and 
Dunne (2002) argue that results of the empirical studies appear to depend 
whether level or share are used.  Hartley and Sandler (1995: 213) argue that if the 
variables are used in levels, the nature of the demand for military expenditure is 
better explained.  Thus, the level data for the defense expenditures is used in this 
study. 
 
 
4.2 Unit Root Tests 
 
In time series stationarity of the variables is important.  Ordinary regressions 
including non-stationary variable may lead to misleading results.  Regressions 
including non-stationary variables could have a non-stationary error term, which 
may calculate high R² even though there is no link between the variables.  
Standard testing procedures became inapplicable to these regressions.  In other 
words, coefficients of the estimate in the non-stationary process do not converge 
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in probability to constants, distributions of F-and t-statistics diverge, DW 
statistics converges in probability to zero and R² has a non-degenerate limiting 
distribution as sample size tends to infinity (Mills, 1993).  This is known as the 
problem of spurious regression (Hendry, 1986; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). 
 
It is argued that differencing a variable is a way of making it stationary.  Let’s 
assume that Xt is a non stationary variable in which differencing d times makes is 
stationary than we may conclude that Xt is integrated of order d (Xt ~ I(d)).  
 
Non-stationarity of a variable may simply be tested by using Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; 1981).  In this test, presence of unit 
root should be tested at level form first.  If ADF test finds the variable non-
stationary, the same test should be performed for the first difference of a variable.  
If first difference of a variable is also found non-stationary, the same test should 
be applied for the second difference of the variable.  This process is repeated up 
to the rejection of the unit root hypothesis (null hypothesis).  
 
ADF test is the OLS regression of the model: 
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The model estimated above is used in testing the presence of unit root at the level 
form of the variable.  Xt-1 is the lag of the variable in level form, ∆Xt-i is the lag 
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of the dependent variable added to the model in order to eliminate the 
autocorrelation, T is trend.  The null and alternative hypotheses are: 
 
0: 00 =γH  
 
01 : γH ‹ 0 
 
ADF test is simply significance test for the coefficient of 01,γ−tX , in the 
regression.  T-value of  Xt-1 is used in this test procedure but critical values are 
different.  Under the 00 ≥γ  condition Xt is non-stationary, so even 
asymptotically its distribution diverge form the standard students t-distribution.  
Since, these statistics do not have the standard-distribution they are referred as τ  
statistics (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).  Critical values presented by 
MacKinnon (1991) are the appropriate one.  Null hypothesis 00 =γ  is implying 
that there is a unit root in the data generating mechanism of a variable. 
Alternative hypothesis is that 0γ  significantly different from zero.   If calculated 
t-value of 0γ  is below the critical value than Xt is stationary.  If not Xt is non-
stationary. 
 
In the case of I(1) variables their first different should be used in regressions. 
Otherwise their estimates became unreliable.  Using the difference of a variable 
instead of its level form may solve the problem of unit root but valuable long-run 
information lost from the models.  Regressions with only difference form of the 
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variables represent short-run relations but not the long-run equilibrium dynamics.  
This later point, promoted the development of error correction models which 
incorporates long-run equilibrium relation into the short-run models. 
 
In addition, one has the choice of including a constant, a constant and a linear 
time trend, or neither in the test regression.  The choice here is important since 
the asymptotic distribution of the t-statistic under the null hypothesis depends on 
the assumptions regarding these deterministic terms.  There remains the problem 
whether to include a constant, a constant and a linear trend, or neither in the test 
regression.  One approach would be to run the test with both a constant and a 
linear trend since the other two cases are just special cases of this more general 
specification.  However, including irrelevant regressors in the regression reduces 
the power of the test, possibly concluding that there is a unit root when, in fact, 
there is none.  The general principle is to choose a specification that is a plausible 
description of the data under both the null and alternative hypotheses (Hamilton, 
1994: 501).  If the series seems to contain a trend, one should include both a 
constant and trend in the test regressions.  If the series does not exhibit any trend 
and has a non-zero mean, one should include a constant in the regression, while if 
the series seems to be fluctuating around a zero mean, one should include neither 
a constant nor a trend in the test regression. 
 
In this study, the regression includes both constant and trend.  The lag lengths are 
chosen according to Akaike Criterion and Schwarz Criterion. 
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4.3 Johansen’s Cointegration Estimation Method  
 
The problem of unit root and the problem of identifying long-run equilibrium 
relations when variables are not stationary were the major econometric problems 
before the development of cointegration.  Cointegration analysis offers a way of 
incorporating long-run relation into a short-run model.  The main idea behind 
cointegration comes from the idea of stationarity.  If variables are non-stationary, 
than their linear combination should be non-stationary also.  If linear combination 
of a non-stationary series is stationary than this imply a kind of tendency of these 
variables to adjust any deviations from the long-run equilibrium condition.  Error 
term of the linear combination of these variables diminishes as time passes and 
goes to zero as time goes to infinity.  Error term of the linear combination is the 
same as deviations from the long-run equilibrium; so as time goes infinity, 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium go to zero. 
 
One of the formal definitions cointegration is: 
 
The components of the n-dimensional vector Zt are said to be 
cointegrated of order d,b denoted Zt~CI(d,b) if (i) all components of Zt 
are I(d); and (ii) there exist at least one vector )0(≠α such that 
.0),(~ >−′= bbdIZtt αν  The vector α  is called the cointegrating 
vector (Engle and Granger, 1987: 253). 
 
 
There are number of different ways of testing and estimating cointegration 
relations.  One of them is the well-known residual-based approach by Engle and 
Granger (1987).  In this method, cointegration relation is estimated by OLS and 
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than the standard unit root test is applied to the estimated residuals, however with 
different critical values1.  In the theory of cointegration, residuals of the 
cointegration relation should be stationary.  Non-stationarity of the estimated 
residuals, on the other hand, concludes the non-existence of a long-run relation.  
Impossibility of testing and estimating more than one-cointegration relation is the 
main weakness of this method.  Later, Johansen and Juselius (1990) proposed an 
alternative method of testing and identifying cointegration vectors when there is 
more than one cointegration relation.  This method is based on the estimation of 
VAR by maximum likelihood. The method is based on VAR (m): 
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Above formulation is known as reparametrised VAR (m) in the VECM form 
(Johansen and Juselius, 1990) in which T is the time trend.  In this regression 
there are n number of variables and  
 
)...( 21 ii CCCI −−−−−=Π  
                                                 
1 Since the null hypothesis is that parameters are estimated from the spurious regression, their 
asymptotic distribution is not the same as the distributions used in the standard unit root tests. 
These are known as Engle-Granger tests. 
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in which α  is the adjustment matrix and β  is the matrix of cointegration vector 
coefficients.  Rank of a matrix β  determines the number of cointegration 
relations.  If the rank of β  is zero than there is no cointegration relations.  If rank 
of β  is equal to the number of variables, than all variables are stationary, and 
again implying that there is no cointegration relation.  If 0 ≤  rank )(β ≤  n than 
there exist a rank )(β number of cointegration relations. 
 
The test statistic is calculated from the residuals of the auxiliary regressions. 
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in which residual sample second-moment matrix is: 
 
  41 
∑
=
− ′Τ=Λ
T
t
jtitij
1
1 εε)      i,j =0,1 
 
LR test statistics of at most m cointegration vectors is: 
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0010 ∧∧∧ − )))  with respect to 
.11∧)  This is known as the trace test statistic. 
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is known as the maximum eigenvalue test which is based only on the r+1’th 
eigenvalue.  The null hypothesis in these LR-tests is that ,0...21 ==== ++ nrr λλλ
)))
 
implying that n-r unit roots exist.  Sequence of hypothesis starting with the 
hypothesis of n unit roots is applied to determine the cointegration rank.  If this 
hypothesis is rejected, than, at least one cointegration relation exist, .01 >λ
)
 The 
test is proceeded by applying the hypothesis .0...32 ==== nλλλ
)))
 Rejection of 
this hypothesis is also implies that 02 >λ
)
, and so forth.  This process is carried 
out up to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis.  At the non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis, the number of significant cointegration relation(s) is/are identified 
(Hansen and Juselius, 1995). 
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Long run exclusion test is applied to test the significance of the each variable in 
the long run cointegration space.  In the null hypothesis, β  coefficients of the 
variables are set equal to zero.  Rejection of the null hypothesis implies the 
significance of the variables in the long-run relation. 
 
Weak exogeneity test, on the other hand, is the test on the α  coefficients of the 
variables in the cointegration equations.  In the null hypothesis, α  coefficients 
are set to zero.  Rejecting the null hypothesis implies the adjustment of the 
variables to the deviations from the long-run equilibrium. 
 
 
4.4 Granger Causality Test 
 
The notion of Granger causality is based on a criterion of incremental forecasting 
value.  A variable X is said to “Granger cause” another variable if “Y can be 
better predicted from the past of X and Y together than the past of Y alone, other 
relevant information being used in the prediction” (Pierce, 1977). 
 
Sims (1972) has shown that a necessary condition for a variable X to be 
exogenous to another variable Y is that Y fails to Granger cause X.  Therefore, 
tests for Granger causality are valuable tools in the empirical analysis of 
economic processes.  Indeed, in economics, tests for Granger causality are 
becoming recognized as essential steps in model building (Sargent 1976, 1979, 
1981)-steps that provide useful information about the reasonableness of 
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alternative structural representations (Hernandez-Iglesias and Hernandez-Iglesias, 
1981). 
 
For the simplest bivariate case, Granger causality can be operationalized in the 
following way:  Consider the process [Xt, Yt], which we will assume to be jointly 
covariance stationary.  Denote by tX and tY all past values of X and Y, 
respectively.  Let all past and present values of these two variables be represented 
as tX  and tY . Define )(
2 ZX tσ   as the minimum predictive error variance of Xt, 
given Z, where Z is composed of the sets [ ]tttt YXYX ,,, .  Then there are four 
possibilities (Granger, 1969): 
 
I. Y causes X: ),(2 ttt XYXσ  ‹ )(2 tt XXσ . 
II. Y causes X instantaneously: ),(2 ttt XYXσ  ‹ ),(2 ttt XYXσ . 
III. Feedback: ),(2 ttt YXXσ  ‹ )(2 tt XXσ , 
      and 
                       ),(2 ttt XYYσ ‹ )(2 tt YYσ . 
IV. Independence: X and Yare not causally related: 
),(2 ttt YXXσ  = ),(2 ttt YXXσ  = )(2 tt XXσ  
and 
),(2 ttt XYYσ  = ),(2 ttt XYYσ  = )(2 tt YYσ  
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For instance, in case I the minimum predictive error variance for Xt is smaller 
when the past values of Y, tY , are included than when the minimum predictive 
error variance is calculated solely on the basis of tX .  When the preceding result 
obtains and, at the same time, X Granger causes Y, we have feedback or case III.  
In case II, it is said that instantaneous causality is occurring.  In other words, the 
current value of Xt is better predicted if the present value of Yt is included in the 
prediction than if it is not. 
 
The definition can be formulated in terms of either the moving average or 
autoregressive form of the (covariance stationary, purely non-deterministic) 
bivariate system.  Each representation, in turn, suggests an alternative test for 
Granger causality. In this study, the “Direct Granger Method” which is a second 
procedure for assessing Granger causality is applied.  To implement this 
approach, one expresses autoregressive representation of the bivariate system in 
the form below.  Let Xt, Yt be two stationary time series with zero means 
(Granger, 1969): 
tt
ii
tt aYXX ++= −
∞
=
∞
=
− ∑∑ 1
1
12
1
111 ππ  
 
tt
i
t
i
t bXYY ++= −
∞
=
−
∞
=
∑∑ 1
1
211
1
22 ππ  
 
where a and b are shocks to the system at time t, neither at nor bt is 
autocorrelated, and at and bs are uncorrelated for all t and s.  A finite number of 
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lags are chosen for the summations on the right sides of the two equations.  Then 
ordinary least squares regression is employed to estimate above equations 
separately.  The test of the hypothesis that the 12π  parameters are jointly zero 
tells us whether Y Granger causes X whereas a test of the hypothesis that the 21π  
parameters are jointly zero indicates whether X Granger causes Y.  If both 
hypotheses are accepted, we conclude X and Y are Granger independent; if both 
are rejected, there is Granger feedback between X and Y.  The familiar F statistic 
usually is employed in making these determinations. 
 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of lag 
length.  If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the omission of 
relevant lags can cause bias.  If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag length, 
the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be inefficient. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Unit Root Test 
 
A unit root test indicates whether or not the data are stationary.  The presence of 
unit root is tested by using the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
procedure.  ADF test is performed by including constant and trend terms in the 
test of the variables. 
 
Table 3: Unit Root Test Results 
Note: (1) ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(2) The lag chosen in the test is the one that minimizes Akaike Information Criterion. 
(3) Eviews Version 4.0 was used for estimation. 
(4) Sample period runs from 1950 to 2001. 
 
 
 Defense Expenditure Consumer Price Index 
  Level 
First 
Difference 
Second 
Difference Level 
First 
Difference 
Second 
Difference 
ADF Test 
Statistic -0,4772 -4,0646 -6,7177 -0,2683 -3,1593 -5,7789 
1% Critical 
Value* 
-4,1498 -4,1540 -4,1584 -4,1498 -4,1540 -4,1584 
5% Critical 
Value 
-3,5005 -3,5025 -3,5045 -3,5005 -3,5025 -3,5045 
10% Critical 
Value 
-3,1793 -3,1804 -3,1816 -3,1793 -3,1804 -3,1816 
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Figure 2: Level and First Difference of Log (defense expenditure)  
LEVEL
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19
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19
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Year
FIRST DIFFERENCE
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
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Figure 3: Level and Second Difference of Log (CPI) 
LEVEL
2
4
6
8
10
19
50
19
53
19
56
19
59
19
62
19
65
19
68
19
71
19
74
19
77
19
80
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
92
19
95
19
98
20
01
Year
SECOND DIFFERENCE
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
1952
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
Year
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For the ADF test, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected against the one- 
sided alternative if the ADF test statistic2 is less than (lies to the left of) the 
critical value.  The test statistics for level data in Table 3 indicate that both data 
are not stationary.  The test statistics are bigger than the critical values at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels.  For defense expenditure data, the ADF test statistic 
for first difference situation is less than the critical values at 5% and 10% 
significance levels.  This indicates that defense expenditure data contains one unit 
root and is integrated of order one I(1). 
 
For Consumer Price Index data, the test fails to reject the test in first difference, 
but rejects the test in second difference for critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels.  This result indicates that it contains two unit roots and is of 
integrated order two I(2).  
 
In addition to the ADF test statistics, graphs of the variables are plotted in order 
to see the nature of the data generating process of the all variables.  Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 are the plot of the variables in their level, first difference and second 
difference forms.  From these graphs, we can conclude that first difference of 
log(defense expenditure) variable and the second difference of the log(CPI) 
variable are stationary.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The ADF test statistic is the t-statistic for the lagged dependent variable in the test regression. 
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5.2 Cointegration Test 
 
The main aim of the study is to test the existence of the long-run relationship 
between defense expenditure and inflation.  If defense expenditure and inflation 
move together over time, cointegration exists between the two variables.  
 
This study uses a Johansen’s cointegration test.3  In order to perform the 
Johansen cointegration tests (Johansen, 1995: 80-84), one must select the 
functional form of the model for cointegration equation (CE) and the series y.  
The five possible forms vary as to whether or not the model includes (1) no trend 
in series y and no constant term in CE, (2) no trend in series y and a constant term 
in the CE, (3) a linear trend in the series y and a constant term in the CE, (4) a 
linear trend in the series y and a linear trend in CE, or (5) a quadratic trend in the 
series y and a linear trend in CE.  Selecting one of the five equations is difficult.  
While no most commonly used equation exists, the following equation is used in 
this study because it fits best with both economic theory and data.  It is proposed 
that:  Equation 1, “no trend and no constant” should be excluded because it is too 
restrictive.  Equation 5 is excluded because it is unlikely that our macroeconomic 
data set has a quadratic form.  The long-run relationship between the defense 
expenditure and inflation includes a constant.  In addition, it is assumed that a 
long-run relationship probably does not include a trend in the cointegration 
equation.  So, equation 3 is selected.  This equation is a typical example of the 
                                                 
3 For vector autoregression (VAR), see Johansen (1995), especially p. 11, p. 45, p. 49. For critical 
value of trace statistic, use Table 1 in Osterwald-Linum (1992). 
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base on which to construct a parallel bivariate model for the causality test.  Linear 
trend in the series y, and constant (no trend) in CE: 
 
Model 00111 )(:)( γαρβα ⊥−− ++′=+Π ttt yBxyrH  
 
where yt  is the n-vector of non-stationary variables, r is the number of 
cointegrating relations,  xt  is the n-vector of deterministic variables, Π is the 
coefficient matrix ( βα ′Π : ), α is the adjustment parameters or speed of 
adjustment (n x 1), β is the cointegrating vector (n x r), ′: transpose, ρ and 0γ  are 
constants, t is the trend, ⊥α  is the non-unique n x (n-r) matrix such that 
0=′ ⊥αα  and rank ([ ⊥′αα ]) = n. 
 
Table 4: Johansen Cointegration Test Results in Terms of Maximum 
Eigenvalue Statistic 
Hypothesized 
Number of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue 
Likelihood 
Ratio (Q max ) 
5 Percent 
Critical Value 
1 Percent 
Critical Value 
r=0 * 0,2917 17,2435 14,07 18,63 
r≤ 1 0,0079 0,3945 3,76 6,65 
Note: (1) *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) significance level. 
(2) Likelihood ratio in the third column is the maximum eigenvalue statistic (Q max ). 
(3) Data of level form were used in the estimation. 
(4) Eviews Version 4.0 was used here. 
(5) Values and their meanings from the first row to the second row: 
      (a) The first row tests the hypothesis of no cointegration. 
      (b) The second row tests the hypothesis of one cointegrating equation. 
 
Data in Table 4 reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% 
significance level since the LR test statistic, 17.2435, is greater than the critical 
value, 14,07.  Data in Table 5 confirm the results indicated in Table 4; the null 
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hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 5% significance level since the 
trace statistic, 17.6380, is greater than the critical value, 15,41. 
 
Table 5: Johansen Cointegration Test Results in Terms of Trace Statistic 
Hypothesized 
Number of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value 
1 Percent 
Critical Value 
r=0 * 0,2917 17,6380 15,41 20,04 
r≤ 1  0,0079 0,3945 3,76 6,65 
Note: (1) *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) significance level. 
(2) Data of level form were used in the estimation. 
(3) Eviews Version 4.0 was used here. 
(4) Values and their meanings from the first row to the second row: 
      (a) The first row tests the hypothesis of no cointegration. 
      (b) The second row tests the hypothesis of one cointegrating equation. 
 
Johansen cointegration tests suggest long-run co-movements exist among 
defense expenditures and inflation.  
 
The latter stage of the cointegration analysis is the identification of the 
normalized eigenvectors.  The cointegration is normalized to consumer price 
index.  Alpha coefficients of both variables are negative and significant, 
indicating the endogeneity of these variables in the cointegration relation (Table 
6). 
 
Table 6: Standardized Eigenvectors and Adjustment Coefficients. 
 β  α 
Log(CPI) 1,00000  -0,12205 
Log(defense expenditure) -0,99612  -0,03019 
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The cointegration relation is the consumer price index function.  Increase in 
defense expenditures by one percent increases consumer price index by 0,99 
percent. 
 
Log(CPI) = 0,99612 Log(defense expenditure) 
 
In this relation increase in defense expenditure increases the consumer price 
index.  The coefficient of the defense expenditure in the equation is significant.  
Thus, it is expected that an increase in defense expenditures will increase the 
inflation almost at the same levels.  
 
 
5.3 Causality Test 
 
The other statistical concept employed in this study is a revision of the one 
known as “Direct Granger Causality.”  The Granger approach allows us to 
ascertain whether defense spending has an impact on inflation, whether 
inflation has an impact on defense spending, whether there is a two way 
relationship between defense spending and inflation, or whether there is no 
relationship between defense spending and inflation. 
 
The Direct Granger approach entails use of the following equations for Turkey 
with data from 1950 to 2001: 
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where X is defense spending, Y is inflation in terms of consumer price index 
and the error terms are represented by a and b.  A finite number of lags is 
chosen for the summations on the right side of the equations, and regression 
techniques are employed for estimation purposes. 
 
The formal development of Granger causality tests assumes that Xt and Yt are 
jointly covariance stationary time series.  In practice, this assumption is 
satisfied by procedures such as first differencing; according to the ADF test 
results employed in this study, the first difference of log(defense expenditure) 
variable and the second difference of the log(CPI) variable are stationary.  Log 
transformations also are employed for the purpose of ameliorating 
heteroskedasticity.  It is decided to follow the same convention.  The first 
difference of defense expenditures and the second difference of inflation (total 
defense spending in current dollars4 and the consumer price index) were used in 
the lagged regressions, and the analysis was carried out with an intercept and a 
trend term for each equation in Turkey’s bivariate system.  The logarithmic 
                                                 
4 First, it is considered using constant (deflated) dollars rather than current dollars for the defense 
spending variable. Then, it is decided not to do so because, among other reasons, of the danger 
that we might create a statistical artifact in the relationship with inflation. 
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transform is a variance-stabilizing device that preserves Granger causality.  The 
intercept term is included to capture any drift (constant rate of change) in the 
dependent variables, while the trend term takes into account any 
(de)acceleration in the same variables. 
 
This study tries lags between 1 and 12.  We choose lags of 2 based on the 
differences in the annual data.  AIC compares to Akaike Final Prediction Error.  
In addition, Schwarz Criterion (SC) is used in conjunction with AIC because 
this strengthens the findings of AIC if there are no contradictions between AIC 
and SC results.  Table 7 clearly indicates no contradiction between AIC and 
SC; both criterions point to the same lag choices.  
 
Table 7: Granger Causality Test (1950-2001) for Constant and Trend 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic AIC SC Probability Lag 
Defense expenditure does not 
Granger cause Consumer 
Price Index 
4,092 -2,927 -2,758 0,024 2 
Consumer Price Index does 
not Granger cause Defense 
expenditure 
5,414 -3,624 -3,455 0,008 2 
Note: (1) Constant and trend reflects use of Equation 3. 
(2) 1-12 lags were tried and lags were chosen based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
the Schwarz Criterion (SC). 
(3) Sample periods are from 1950 to 2001 and Eviews Version 4.0 was used for estimations. 
(4) Detailed description of this test, see Granger (1969). 
(5) An F value of 2,578 is needed for significance at the .05 level with 4 and 48 degrees of 
freedom. 
 
 
A significant F statistic allows us to reject the relevant null hypotheses in Table 
7 and infer the existence of the respective hypothesized relationships between 
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defense spending and inflation.  As it can be seen in Table 7, F statistics are 
significant at the .05 significance level (2,578<4,092 and 2,578<5,414).  In 
addition to significant F statistics, the probabilities of both null hypotheses are 
very low which indicates the rejection of them.  This means that the lagged 
values of inflation jointly have a statistically significant impact on defense 
spending, and the lagged values of defense spending jointly have a statistically 
significant impact on inflation.  Hence, there is Granger feedback (X↔Y) 
between defense spending and inflation for Turkey. 
 
It is known that defense spending does not have a direct link with inflation.  On 
the other hand, it is also known that defense spending is one of the main causes 
of budget deficit.  As Friedman (1990) stated earlier, budget deficit will lead to 
higher inflation if financed by creating money.  Thus, our results indicate that 
Turkish defense expenditures have an implicit effect on inflation and 
governments choose to monetize the increasing budget deficits. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
The unique contribution of this thesis is that it provided empirical evidence to the 
relationship between defense expenditures and inflation in Turkey by employing 
cointegration and causality analyses.  
 
Clearly the relationship between defense spending and inflation is a 
complicated one.  The direction and the size of this relationship can differ 
across different countries.  It is obvious that many of the claims found in the 
literature do not clearly and unambiguously hold up across countries.  It should 
be recalled Schultze (1981) argues that the impact of defense spending is 
mitigated if such spending comes at the expense of consumption rather than 
investment. 
 
Both defense spending and inflation are very complex phenomena.  It has been 
shown that during the period of our study there appeared to be a direct two-way 
relationship between these phenomena in Turkey.  It appears that other factors 
must also be taken into account.  We hope that a contribution has been made by 
the providing a stimulus for further research on the important defense spending-
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inflation relationship.  Considerable work remains to be done on the theoretical 
and empirical levels.  We encourage other scholars to join in these research 
efforts. 
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APPENDIX A: Major Spenders in 2003. 
Military expenditure: in MER dollar terms in PPP dollar terms 
Rank Country 
Level 
($b.) 
Per 
capita 
($) 
World 
share 
(%) Rank Country 
Level 
($b.) 
1 USA 417,4 1419 47 1 USA 417,4 
2 Japan 46,9 367 5 2 China 151,0 
3 UK 37,1 627 4 3 India 64,0 
4 France 35 583 4 4 Russia [63,2] 
5 China [32,8]  25 4 5 France 38,4 
Sub-total top 5 569,1   64 Sub-total top 5 734,0 
6 Germany 27,2 329 3 6 UK 35,0 
7 Italy 20,8 362 2 7 Japan 32,8 
8 Iran [19.2]  279  [2] 8 Germany 30,4 
9 S. Arabia 19,1 789 [2] 9 Italy 26,4 
10 South Korea 13,9 292 2 10 S. Arabia 25,6 
Sub-total top 10 669,3   76 Sub-total top 10 884,2 
11 Russia [13,0] 91 1 11 South Korea 25,0 
12 India 12,4 12 1 12 Iran [23,7] 
13 Israel 10,0 1551 1 13 Turkey 22,5 
14 Turkey 9,9 139 1 14 Brazil [21,0] 
15 Brazil 9,2 51 1 15 Pakistan 15,0 
Sub-total top 15 723,8   82 Sub-total top 15 991,4 
World 879,0   100 World   
Note: (1) MER: Market Exchange Rate. 
(2) PPP: Purchasing Power Parity. 
(3) Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2004. 
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APPENDIX B: Data Set 
YEAR 
Defense 
Expenditures 
(TL. Million) 
Consumer 
Price Index 
Budget Deficit 
(TL. Million) 
Defense 
Expenditures 
in Budget   
(TL. Million) 
Defense 
Expenditures 
as a Share of 
Budget 
1950 599 339,2 -114,6 475,4 24,3 
1951 652 335,5 56,2 505,6 24,5 
1952 725 352,6 63,1 644,0 24,4 
1953 827 369,5 -28,6 735,2 28,6 
1954 936 402,8 -118,5 874,0 32,1 
1955 1.077 450,7 -53,3 1.218,8 35,3 
1956 1.159 502,6 -138,5 1.052,3 28,3 
1957 1.266 565,4 -39,9 1.162,1 26,6 
1958 1.470 654,1 16,4 1.505,6 28,6 
1959 2.153 802,0 107,8 1.901,4 27,0 
1960 2.410 861,3 -40,0 1.912,6 24,5 
1961 2.718 872,5 -233,2 2.400,3 20,2 
1962 2.980 905,7 99,8 2.571,1 26,3 
1963 3.157 964,5 167,3 2.903,1 23,4 
1964 3.443 972,3 -613,0 3.256,6 22,7 
1965 3.821 1.037,4 -616,6 3.410,6 22,1 
1966 3.996 1.094,5 -90,0 3.853,4 21,2 
1967 4.596 1.163,4 232,8 4.294,3 19,9 
1968 5.159 1.211,1 -592,1 4.749,3 20,4 
1969 5.395 1.280,1 -1.600,0 4.738,9 17,7 
1970 6.237 1.431,2 210,7 5.533,2 15,9 
1971 8.487 1.743,2 -6.343,1 8.025,8 16,4 
1972 9.961 2.009,9 -353,6 8.877,4 16,3 
1973 12.192 2.327,5 -2.216,0 11.444,5 16,9 
1974 15.831 2.685,9 -3.904,4 15.302,4 18,6 
1975 30.200 3.196,2 -1.225,3 20.054,6 16,7 
1976 40.691 3.720,1 -3.955,1 26.348,4 16,2 
1977 49.790 4.557,1 -40.347,5 35.414,9 14,2 
1978 66.239 6.986,1 -23.869,5 43.516,4 12,1 
1979 93.268 11.317,4 -60.163,5 79.253,4 12,5 
1980 185.656 22.793,2 -159.324,9 184.826,8 16,1 
1981 313.067 30.543,0 -96.514,3 251.184,0 15,4 
1982 447.790 39.217,3 -142.729,8 269.340,0 15,3 
1983 556.738 51.527,6 -219.185,4 403.083,1 13,8 
1984 803.044 76.466,9 -508.291,9 578.514,6 13,5 
1985 1.235.000 110.838,8 -513.156,1 832.877,2 12,9 
1986 1.868.000 149.211,2 -1.157.818,7 1.234.744,8 15,0 
1987 2.477.000 207.179,8 -2.346.351 1.627.296 12,8 
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APPENDIX B: CONTINUED 
YEAR 
Defense 
Expenditures 
(TL. Million)* 
Consumer 
Price Index** 
Budget Deficit 
(TL. Million)*** 
Defense 
Expenditures 
in Budget   
(TL. Million)*** 
Defense 
Expenditures 
as a Share of 
Budget*** 
1988 3.789.000 359.871,2 -3.858.686 2.529.393 11,8 
1989 7.158.000 587.561,8 -7.502.599 5.097.234 13,2 
1990 13.865.971 941.839,2 -11.781.831 9.110.286 13,3 
1991 23.656.518 1.563.453,1 -33.316.635 16.074.415 12,1 
1992 42.319.927 2.659.433,7 -47.328.000 …  11,2 
1993 77.716.559 4.417.259,1 -133.105.000 …  10,9 
1994 156.723.653 9.112.805,6 -150.839.000 85.377.000 11,0 
1995 302.863.749 17.642.391,7 -314.944.000 205.133.000 12,0 
1996 611.521.230 31.826.874,5 -1.233.350.000 400.479.000 10,2 
1997 1.183.326.780 59.102.506,0 -2.235.153.000 878.995.000 11,0 
1998 2.289.429.900 109.127.656,5 -3.803.376.000 1.617.887.000 10,5 
1999 4.167.636.000 179.916.016,4 -9.151.620.000 2.841.694.000 10,2 
2000 6.998.960.000 278.717.584,8 
-
12.846.190.000 4.421.344.000 9,5 
2001 9.030.392.000 430.339.950,9 
-
29.036.095.000 6.404.565.000 7,9 
Note: (1) * Source: SIPRI yearbooks various issues. Figures are in current prices. 
(2) ** Source: State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Indicators, 1923-2002. 
(3) *** Source: Ministry of Finance, the Realization of Budget Revenues and Expenditures (1924-
1991) (From 1938 to 1991). 
State Institute of Statistics, Fiscal and Financial Statistics, 1980-2001 (From 1992 to 2001). 
(4) … Not available. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
